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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
JOHN HENRY MAURER 
Defendant/Appellant 
CASE NO. 860006 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against John Henry Maurer 
for Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a First Degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1953 as amended). 
A jury found Mr. Maurer guilty following a trial which lasted from 
November 12 through November 15, 1985, in the Third District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier, Judge, presiding. On November 18, 1985, Mr. Maurer was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life in the 
Utah State Prison. (R.246). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John Maurer met Janet Hannan in 1984, and began to develop a 
relationship with her that eventually stabilized when they moved 
into a condominium together in June of 1984. (T.91,110). John was work 
at Sperry Univac, and as a recovered alcoholic, had been free from 
the use of controlled substances for several years* (T.108,109). 
His good friend, Mike Bickley, was also an alcoholic, and they had 
developed a close relationship over a several year period* (T.109,110). 
In October of 1984, Janet and John became engaged to be 
married. (T.110). Things went along smoothly for the next few 
months. John was re-establishing contact with his family in 
New York from whom he'd been ostracized for some time as a result 
of his "black sheep" lifestyle. (T.270). 
In January of 1985, things turned sour. At the Superbowl 
game at Mike Bickley's house, Mike suggested a three-way sexual 
affair between he, Janet and John, and John became very angry and 
left. (T.112). The next day Mike and Janet began a sexual affair 
behind John's back. (T.113). 
On January 30, John received a call from Janet at work. (T.93). 
She told him the engagement was off and not to bother to come 
home. (T.93). John immediately came home to talk to Janet, and he 
was visibly upset. (T.93). Janet's parents were at the condominium 
(they were in town on a ski vacation), so John asked to talk to her 
privately. (T.93,114). They went outside where Janet told John that 
the relationship was over and that he should return the following 
morning to remove his belongings. 
John left the condominium in a state of emotional turmoil and 
called a suicide hotline. He was referred to St. Mark's Hospital. 
(T.226). At the hospital he spoke with doctors and was diagnosed as 
suffering from "acute situational anxiety and grief reaction". 
(T.228). He also called his mother and asked her to call Janet at 
the condominium the next morning to try to patch things up. (T.235) . 
The doctor gave him some Valium and allowed him to leave with a 
friend, Ed Gutierrez. (T.228,119). 
Ed and John went to Ed's apartment where they talked for about 
three hours. (T.236). John was crying, very depressed, and "down 
on himself". (T.236). He slept for two or three hours and then in 
the morning left Ed's to return to the condominium where he was 
supposed to meet Janet and move his things out. (T.238). On the 
way he again stopped at the hospital to get some Valium. (T.269). 
Janet and Mike arrived soon after John at the condominium. 
(T.90,94). John asked Mike to leave for a period of time so he 
could speak to Janet. (T.95). Janet was staunch in her decision to 
break off the relationship and began to move John's clothing out of 
the bedroom. At one point, John's mother called and spoke with 
Janet. John perceived from Janet's end of the conversation that 
his mother sided with Janet. (T.271). Shortly thereafter Mike 
returned. (T.97). 
John was pacing from the kitchen to the living room to the 
bedroom, alternating between being very upset and very calm. (T.97,119) 
He was crying, and then at one point hugged Janet and Mike and 
told Janet she deserved someone better than him. (T.120). He 
asked Mike, "don't you feel guilty about this?" (T.120). Mike 
said yes, he felt guilty enough so that the first time he and 
Janet had sex he couldn't "get it up." (T.122). At this point 
despair turned to rage, and John suddenly went to the kitchen, 
grabbed a knife, and went into the bedroom where Janet was removing 
his clothes and stabbed her in the back. (T.122). 
John fought with Mike when he tried to summon help. (T.100). 
Janet died shortly thereafter. After the stabbing, Mike said 
John had a "strange smile" on his face (T.102), and the paramedics 
used the following words to describe John's affect; "laughing" (T.152), 
more or less "pleased" (T.158), "smart-aleck grin" (T.163), "cold 
mean stare" (T.164), and "he had a crazed look in his eyes, as if 
he had seen a ghost." (T.165). 
At trial, Dr. Mercedes Reisinger, a psychologist, and 
Dr. Alan Jeppsen, a psychiatrist, testified that in their opinions, 
Mr. Maurer was acting under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance at the time he killed Janet. (T.301,317). 
Dr. Jeppsen testified that, from Mr. Maurer's perspective, every 
significant person in his life had rejected him—his fiance and 
her family, his friend, and his mother, in siding with Janet. 
(T.271). He said such a sequence of events was very shattering 
for Mr. Maurer. (T.271). Dr. Lincoln Clark, a psychiatrist for 
the State, testified that Mr. Maurer had been emotionally hurt by 
Janet's rejection, and that what happened was an account of very 
basic human emotion (anger, jealousy) in a crisis situation. 
(T.467,468). 
The jury convicted Mr. Maurer of Second Degree Murder on 
November 15, 1985. (R.241). He was sentenced to the indeterminate 
period of five years to life in the Utah State Prison on 
November 18, 1985. (R.246). From that judgment and conviction 
this appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
into evidence a letter written by Appellant more than a month after 
the homicide, absent a showing that the letter had some probative 
value which was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
The trial court erred in refusing to ask the jury panel 
questions concerning important issues in Appellant's case so as to 
allow Appellant to intelligently exercise his pre-emptory challenges. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
INTO EVIDENCE A LETTER WRITTEN BY 
APPELLANT TO THE VICTIM'S FATHER 
OVER A MONTH AFTER THE HOMICIDE. 
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a Motion to preclude the State 
from introducing into evidence a letter written by Mr. Maurer to 
the victim's father, Mike Hannan. (R.38). The letter was written 
by Mr. Maurer on March 10, 1985, while he was awaiting trial in 
the Salt Lake County Jail, nearly one and one-half months after 
Janet Hannan was killed. The letter expressed, among other things, 
Mr. Maurer's satisfaction with killing the victim. A copy of the 
letter is attached as Addendum A. 
The court denied Appellant's Motion in Limine on the basis 
that the letter was probative of Mr. Maurer's state of mind at the 
time of the homicide, and thus would assist the jury in determining 
whether Mr. Maurer was guilty of Second Degree Murder or Manslaughter. 
(Pre-trial Motion T.24). 
Subsequently, Appellant petitioned the trial court for a 
rehearing on the motion, and argument was heard November 12, just 
prior to trial. (T.2). Mr. Maurer again asserted that a fair 
application of Rules 803 and 403 of the Rules of Evidence 
prohibited the introduction of the letter into evidence. (T.3). 
Appellant conceded that the letter was technically admissible as 
nonhearsay under U.R.E. 801(d) (2), (Admission by Party Opponent), 
but argued that there was no material issue as to who killed 
Janet Hannan. (T.4). Appellant was prepared to stipulate that he, 
in fact, intentionally caused Ms. Hannan's death. (T.4). Nor was 
there any material issue with respect to the manner, time, and 
place of death. The only issue to be addressed by the trier of 
fact was whether Mr. Maurer was acting under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there was a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. 
Defense Counsel further argued that the letter was not 
admissible as evidence of Mr. Maurer's state of mind at the time 
the homicide occurred. (T.5). Mr. Maurer claimed that the letter 
was written at a time too remote to reflect accurately on whether 
he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he killed 
the victim. (T.6). Finally, Mr. Maurer argued that even if the 
letter had some relevance on the issue of state of mind, the 
prejudicial effect of the letter far exceeded its potential 
relevance under U.R.E. 403 (See, generally, T.6-8). 
The State responded, first, that the letter was admissible as 
an admission, and second, that the letter was being offered to 
corroborate the State's view that Mr. Maurer intentionally killed 
the victim without any justification or mitigation. (T.12). On 
the issue of prejudice, the prosecutor argued that all evidence 
introduced by the State is designed to '^ prejudicd1 the defendant. (T.12) . 
The court subsequently denied the motion to exclude the 
letter. Noting that the issue revolved around whether Mr. Maurer 
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
at the time of the crime, the court concluded that, "the probative 
value of the letter goes to the state of the mind of the defendant... 
on the date the offense allegedly occurred." (T.63). The court 
further found that the "probative value is not outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, nor is there 
any chance of misleading the jury..." (T.63). The letter was 
subsequently admitted into evidence over Appellant's objection. (T.219). 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
the letter into evidence. It had little or no relevance to the 
only disputed issue in the case, and any potential relevance it 
may have had was substantially outweighed by the danger that it 
unfairly prejudiced Mr. Maurer. 
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A. THE LETTER WAS NOT RELEVANT TO 
APPELLANT'S STATE OF MIND AT 
THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF 
THE OFFENSE. 
Evidence is "relevant" if it has any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
"facts of consequence" in this case are limited to Mr. Maurer's 
state of mind on January 31, 1985. Therefore, for the letter to 
be relevant, it must tend to make the existence of Mr. Maurer's 
"extreme mental or emotional disturbance" less likely. A review 
of the caselaw provides nothing on point since it is apparent 
that no cases exist which present an identical factual scenario. 
Nevertheless, some helpful guidelines emerge which can be applied 
to Mr. Maurer's issue by analogy. 
In State v. Marlar, 498 P2d 1276 (Id. 1972) , defendant was 
charged with Assault with a Deadly Weapon. He had observed a 
fellow employee sitting with his wife in her car, where they 
were conversing and possibly embracing. Defendant rammed her car 
with his pick-up truck, and then when the man got out of the car, 
defendant allegedly swore at him and hit him in the head with a 
gun. At trial, the state sought to introduce a subsequent telephone 
conversation wherein defendant, among other things, told the 
victim "he would put him in the morgue." Id., at 1280. The state 
argued that the statements by the defendant were relevant to his 
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state of mind at the time of the assault. The court noted that 
prior threats may be admissible, as they comprise "part of the 
mosaic of the criminal event," but that statements subsequent to 
the event are not normally an integral part of the event unless 
they "indicate a state of mind or an intent existing at the time 
of the commission of the offense." Id., at 1282. 
Holding that the statement was inadmissible, the court 
said that the statement ("I'll put you in the morgue") did not 
tend to establish state of mind at the time of the alleged crime. 
The court observed that "the statement, at most, was an opprobrious 
remark illustrating the caller's malevolent attitude toward the 
witness Higgins at the time the statement was made." Id., at 1283. 
The court concluded by stating that even if it could glean some 
probative value from the statement, it would be so slight that 
admission of the statement into evidence would be unjustifiably 
prejudicial. 
In State v. Sempsrott, 587 SW.2d 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), 
defendant wrote a letter to the murder victim's sister seven 
months after the murders. In the letter defendant expressed 
remorse for his deed and said he was unable to explain what 
happened the night of the homicide. He offered the letter at 
The state also argued that the statement, along with other 
statements allegedly made in an effort to get the charges 
dismissed, were implied admissions of guilt or showed consciousness 
of a weak case. The court rejected that argument, but recognized 
the general rule that evidence which tends to show the accused has 
either attempted to fabricate or procure false evidence or suppress 
incriminating evidence is relevant and admissible against him or 
her. Id., at 1283. 
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trial to help prove his state of mind at the time of the incident. 
The court found that the letter was inadmissible because it was 
self serving and not part of the "res gestae." The court 
observed that in order for the statements to be admissible, they 
must be the "apparently spontaneous result of the occurrence 
operating upon [the defendant's] perceptive senses." Id., at 634. 
The court further noted that "declarations that are the product 
of reasoning from collateral facts are not part of the res gestae," 
citing State v. O'Neal, 436 SW2d 241, 144 (Mo. 1968). Where the 
murders and the statements did not form "one continuous transaction," 
the court said, the statements were inadmissible. 
In State v. Newman, 513 P2d 258 (Mont. 1973), defendant 
appealed his conviction of involuntary manslaughter of his wife. 
He argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting 
statements allegedly made by his wife to two neighbors concerning 
a beating defendant gave her. The statements were made 12 to 13 
hours after the alleged beating occurred. The appellate court 
agreed that they were inadmissible since they were not spontaneous 
and substantially contemporaneous with the injury-causing event. 
The court discussed the "res gestae" exception to the hearsay 
rule, and its four modern components; 1) excited utterances, 
2) declarations of present sense impressions, 3) declarations 
as to state of mind, and 4) declarations as to body condition. 
The rationale behind all of these exceptions, said the court, is 
that the statements are contemporaneous with the event, therefore 
lending a particular reliability or trustworthiness to them. 
In People v. Northrop, 182 Cal Rptr. 197 (Cal Ct. App. 1982), 
defendant was charged with murder and felony child abuse of her 
young child, who had died from organ damage and bone injuries. 
At trial, in support of her theory that her husband caused the 
child's death, she offered testimony concerning two conversations 
she had had with her mother and her husband which expressed fear 
about her husband's tendency for violence and abuse. These 
conversations occurred in June and September of 1979 and the 
victim's life was taken in December of the same year. The court 
denied her request because the conversations were too remote in 
time to be sufficiently probative of her state of mind 
during the time in question. The court observed that to be 
admissible, the evidence must have more than "slight relevancy" 
to the issues presented, and must be of some "competent, substanti 
and significant value," citing People v. Green, 609 P2d 468 
(Cal Ct. App. 1980), 182 Cal Rptr, at 206. In the context of 
these standards, the court concluded that the proffered evidence 
"reflected only indirectly upon appellant's state of mind at a 
remote time." Id. 
In the instant case, Mr. Maurer's letter to Mr. Hannan had no 
relevancy to his state of mind at the time he committed the crime. 
As in Marlar, supra, the statement at best illustrated Mr. Maurer' 
"malevolent attitude" toward the victim's father when he wrote the 
letter, not his emotional and mental state on January 31, 1985. 
Most, if not all, of the comments in the letter were calculated to 
hurt the father. (T.464). The state didn't argue, at any time, 
either in its rebuttal to the Motion in Limine, or its summation 
to the jury, that Mr. Maurer killed the victim to hurt Mr. Hannan. 
Thus, any connection between the letter and Appellant's state of 
mind on January 31, 1985, was tenuous, at best. 
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Noteworthy of comment is the fact that neither the State nor 
the trial court ever articulated how the letter tended to show 
Mr. Maurer's state of mind at the time he killed the victim. The 
essential message of the letter was lack of remorse. This lack of 
remorse was demonstrated after 38 days of confinement under 
circumstances where any number of factors could have influenced 
Appellant's emotional state. Lack of remorse exhibited over one 
month after a homicide may be properly addressed in a sentencing 
context, but such evidence has no tendency to prove Appellant's 
mental state at the time of the offense. 
Northrop, Newman, and Sempsrott, supra, stand firmly for the 
proposition that statements regarding state of mind at the time of 
an event which are made at a remote time are inherently unreliable. 
John Maurer's letter is not an "apparently spontaneous result of 
the occurrence [the homicide] operating upon [his] senses." 
Sempsrott, at 634. Rather, the "declaration [is a] product of 
reasoning from collateral facts...not part of the res gestae." Id. 
The letter had no "competent, substantial, and significant value" 
on the issue of whether John Maurer was operating under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there was a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. Northrop,at 206. The letter, 
therefore, should have been excluded at trial, and it was error 
for the court to refuse to do so. 
B. ANY RELEVANCE OF THE LETTER 
WAS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED 
BY ITS UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO 
THE APPELLANT. 
Even if the letter was relevant, the court erred in admitting 
it into evidence where the relevance was substantially outweighed 
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by its prejudice to Mr, Maurer. Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence states that: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
The court in United States v. Grassi, 602 F2d 1192 (Fifth 
Circuit 1979) discussed the analysis underlying Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403, which is identical to the corresponding Utah rule. 
The court noted that 403 requires a determination by the trial 
court of the relative probity and prejudice inherent in the 
introduction of a particular piece of evidence. The "probative 
value" must be determined by evaluating first, the tendency of the 
evidence to prove an issue of consequence, and second, the 
proponent's need for the evidence. See 602 F2d, at 1195, and 
cases cited therein. The potential for "unfair prejudice" must 
next be examined. Unfair prejudice, the court stated, does not 
refer only to the fact that items of evidence will have adverse 
effects on a party's case, since most evidence offered by an 
opponent should have this effect. Id. Rather, "unfair prejudice" 
within this context means"an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision 
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an 
emotional one." Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 403, at 102. 
State v. Cloud, 722 P2d 750, (Utah 1986) addressed the issue 
of admissibility of gruesome photographs in the context of a 
Rule 403 argument by the defense. In support of its charge of 
Second Degree Murder, the State sought to admit photographs of the 
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deceased which depicted the victim's prone body, her multiple 
wounds, and her finger extended in an "obscene gesture." The 
state argued that the photographs were relevant to show the 
intentional nature of the attack. Appellant objected, based on 
his position that the cause and manner of death were undisputed, so 
that the sole issue was whether or not Appellant killed while under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
In analyzing the evidence, this Court discussed whether the 
evidence had "essential evidentiary value," that is, whether the 
evidence was the best available means of conveying the information, 
and secondly, if it was, whether it was outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice. This Court reached the inescapable conclusion 
that the pictures had no essential evidentiary value since what 
they portrayed was conveyed to the jury via nonprejudicial means. 
Moreover, the photographs were not relevant to rebut the defense's 
theory of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The only likely 
use of the photographs was for an improper purpose, to inflame the 
jury. The court thus held the admission of the photographs to be 
reversible error. 
Rule 403 also allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence 
on the grounds that it confuses the issues or misleads the jury. 
In State v. Miller, 709 P2d 350 (Utah 1985) , the court excluded 
proffered psychiatric testimony by the defense on the grounds that 
it would be speculative and confuse the jury. Appellant sought 
to admit testimony of a psychologist with expertise in sexual 
abuse of children who would testify, inter alia, about typical 
psychological profiles of sex offenders. This Court affirmed 
Appellant's conviction and agreed with the trial court that the 
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admission of such evidence would shift the focus from whether 
Appellant had committed the crime to whether Appellant fit the 
psychological profile of a sex offender. Similarly, in Pearce v. 
Wistisen, 701 P2d 489 (Utah 1985) , this court held in a wrongful 
death action, that the admission of evidence concerning defendant's 
behavior the night before the accident tended to improperly shift 
the focus of the lawsuit. In Pearce, the decedent was killed in a 
boating accident, and the defendant sought to show that decedent's 
alcohol consumption the night before contributed to his fate. This 
court disagreed, observing that the inquiry should have focused on 
decedent's actions surrounding the accident rather than his 
consumption of alcohol the night before and related "character 
evidence." 
An application of the Rule 403 principles discussed above 
mandates exclusion of the letter in the instant case. The letter 
had no "essential evidentiary value," like the photographs in 
Cloud, supra. Moreover, it created a risk of unduly prejudicing 
the Appellant as well as misleading and confusing the jury. Cloud, 
Miller, and Pearce, supra. 
The sole issue before the jury was whether Mr. Maurer acted 
under extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he killed Janet 
Hannan. Even if the letter was relevant to the issue of Mr. Maurer's 
state of mind, it was not the only available means of presenting 
state of mind evidence to the jury. The prosecution did not "need" 
the evidence, since ample evidence of Mr. Maurer's conduct and 
statements was presented through Mr. Bickley, Mr. Hannan, Mr. Gutierrezi 
several EMT's, and testimony of two psychiatrists and one psychologist. 
Their testimony concentrated on the most reliable evidence regarding 
Mr. Maurer's emotional state, evidence contemporaneous with the 
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offense itself. The letter, therefore, lacked "essential 
evidentiary value." 
The letter carried with it an extreme danger of "unfair 
prejudice." It suggested a decision on an emotional, and thus 
improper basis. The State was keenly aware of the impact such an 
offensive document would have on a jury. Mr. Maurer's vituperative 
and revengeful comments chill even the most casual observer. The 
admission of this letter into evidence was tantamount to a directed 
verdict for the State. The prosecutor effectively used the letter 
to inflame the jury against Mr. Maurer. In his opening statement, 
he referred to the letter as an "especially crucial piece of 
evidence." (T.78). In his closing argument, he said the letter 
referred to the victim in "terms disgusting for human beings," (T.486) 
and that the letter blamed others for the killing while showing no 
remorse. (T.486). By the use of the letter, the prosecutor shifted 
the jury's attention away from the operative facts of the offense 
to a gruesome picture of a vituperative man undeserving of any 
mitigation under the law. 
The letter should also have been excluded since any probative 
value it had was substantially outweighed by the danger it confused 
the issues and misled the jury. The letter and potential reasons 
for its production became a focus of the trial. In an effort to 
explain its relationship to Mr. Maurer's state of mind at the time 
of the offense, the defense was forced to present psychiatric 
evidence of Mr. Maurer's mental illness at the time he wrote the 
letter. Dr. Reisinger testified that Mr. Maurer's "reality testing" 
was limited and because of his pathology, he was unable to face his 
pain and guilt. (T.321,340). As a result, he continued to "devalue" 
the victim in order to justify his behavior. (T.321). Without 
that defense mechanism, he would have been at risk for suicide• 
(T.321). Dr. Jeppsen agreed, (T.276) and further testified that 
the letter may have been a mechanism to effectuate a death wish 
or assure John's punishment. Dr. Jeppsen also said it could be 
viewed as a possible cry for help, so that others would see the 
extent of his pathology. (T.276). 
All of this was absolutely irrelevant to the central issue in 
the case; namely, whether, at the time of the homicide, a reasonable 
person in Mr. Maurer's shoes would have been influenced by extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance. On one hand the jury was asked 
to focus on the operative events in John's life as they contributed 
to his crime from an objective standpoint, and on the other, they 
were asked to focus on his psychiatric illness and its relationship 
to the letter from a subjective standpoint. While the issues are 
legally distinct, no jury could be expected to compartmentalize and 
analyze them separately. A court cannot be sure that evidence 
concerning Appellant's mental illness didn't contaminate and 
thereby eviscerate his defense under the manslaughter statute with 
its objective standard. The letter completely confused the issue 
of Mr. Maurer's culpability at the time of the offense and it should 
never have been admitted. 
The trial court erred in admitting the letter into evidence 
even if it had some relevance or probative value. The substantial 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and of it misleading 
the jury warranted its exclusion. State v. Pierre, 572 P2d 1338, 
1352 (Utah 1977) mandates a reversal if "there exists a reasonable 
probability or likelihood that there would have been a result more 
favorable to the defendant in absence of the error." Under this 
standard, the trial court's ruling was reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ASK QUESTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENSE 
COUNSEL DURING VOIR DIRE, 
Voir dire examination generally consists of face-to-face 
questioning of prospective jurors by counsel or the trial judge in 
an effort to determine the juror's ability to decide a case fairly 
and impartially. Voir dire's recognized purpose is to detect 
actual bias and to collect sufficient information to permit the 
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. State v. Ball, 455 
(Utah 1983); State v. Lockett, 1654 P.2d 433, 438 (Kansas 1982); 
People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 873 (Cal. 1981). Any rule of law 
or any trial court ruling that denies a litigant the examination 
of prospective jurors concerning their qualifications, in order to 
enable the litigant to exercise peremptory challenges judiciously 
and intelligently, deprives the party of a substantial right. 
People v. Williams, supra at 876; State v. Ball, supra at 1060. 
The sole issue is whether defense counsel, considering the totality 
of the questions permitted, gained enough specific information to 
intelligently exercise challenges for cause and enough general 
information to exercise peremptory challenges. Bolhouse v. State, 
687 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1984). 
In Utah, the trial judge normally has broad discretionary 
power in the conduct of voir dire. State v. Ball, supra at 1060; 
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,60 (Utah 1982). This discretion 
is permitted to enable the trial court to accelerate the process 
by prohibiting irrelevant inquiry, State v. Lockett, supra at 439; 
to protect the privacy of the juror, State v. Ball, supra at 1060; 
and to prevent conditioning of prospective jurors as to evidence 
which will be heard at trial, People v. Williams, supra at 887. 
The fact that the trial court is entitled to proceed with 
voir dire is, however, not to say that a trial court should fail 
to exercise the discretion conferred on it by state law. While 
there is no strict test, courts must generally allow considerable 
latitude in the examination of jurors, State v. Lockett, supra at 
438; State v. Camarillo, 678 P.2d 102, 104 (Idaho App. 1984), thus 
granting the accused every reasonable protection. State v. Herman, 
611 P.2d 748,750 (Wash. 1980). Expedition should not be used at 
the consequence of the quality of justice. People v. Williams, 
supra at 877. 
In State v. Ball, supra, this court reversed a conviction for 
driving under the influence of alcohol because the trial court 
refused to allow defense counsel to question potential jurors, 
who abstained from drinking alcohol, concerning any possible 
religious basis for abstention. In discussing the relevancy of 
the question the court noted: 
Of course it does not follow that the person who 
abstains from alcohol for religious or moral 
reasons will therefore necessarily be unable to 
act as a fair and impartial juror in a trial for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. It does, 
however, follow that a defense attorney may, 
from a similar analysis, conclude that one person 
is generally less impartial than another. It is 
to allow such decisions to be informed that a 
party must be allowed to gather sufficient 
relevant information during voir dire. 
Id. at 1060. 
In this case, Appellant submitted proposed questions to the 
jury panel on voir dire (see Addendum B). Defense counsel wanted 
to ask potential jurors whether they thought psychiatrists or 
psychologists "have valuable insights into human behavior" (T.68), 
and if the jurors would "be likely to disregard testimony" of 
psychiatrists or psychologists (T.69). The trial court refused to 
ask these questions stating that these questions would be covered 
in the final jury instructions. (T.69). Counsel was also prohibited 
from obtaining information about prior experience of the jurors in 
stressful or volitile emotional relationships, and prior experience 
with alcohol. (T.70). As a result, Appellant was unable to gather 
sufficient relevant information during voir dire to intelligently 
exercise peremptory challenges or gain adequate information so as 
to successfully challenge for cause. Mr. Maurer was thereby 
deprived of a substantial right. People v. Williams, supra, at 876; 
State v. Ball, supra at 1060. 
The only issue in this case was the mental state of Mr. Maurer 
at the time of the killing. By not allowing defense counsel to 
ask questions concerning the juror's views on psychology and 
expert testimony, as well as their experience with volitile 
emotional relationships, the trial court prevented counsel from 
gaining information on this vital point of the case. Appellant 
urges this court to find that the voir dire, an essential proceeding 
in a trial, was so flawed by the trial court's refusal to ask 
proposed questions that it fatally tainted the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks 
reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to the District 
Court for dismissal of the charges and/or a new trial, or a 
finding of guilty of Manslaughter,5L second degree felony. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1986. 
NANCY BERGESON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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To Mike Hannon,* 
Just a letter to let you know that I'm glad I killed 
Janet. uDaddyfs Little Girl11 is no more. You spoiled 
her rotten. Thank Cod you were not there that morning. 
You might have prevented it. I hope you feel guilt over 
it. 
It was a great feeling to watch her die. She kept 
crying "It hurts, It hurts". I should hope so, I mean it 
was a 13 inch kitchen knife. Hike Bickley got to watch her 
die too. It was great. Your daughter was nothing but a 
whore, a fucking whore. Drifting from one man to another. 
She couldn't break the engagement herself. No Daddy had to 
demand that she make a decision. God she was 29 and couldn't 
function or live without you doing everything for her. 
So you had her buried in the Catholic section of the 
Salt Lake Cemetary. After her having an abortion? You 
fucking cover up artists, I hope her her death hurt you. 
Or are you relieved? Uhat a stupid bitch she was. She did 
everything in the relationship and I sat back and did very 
little. I love it! She was so emotional and stupid. But 
basically a real whore. \Jhat are you going to do now? Brin^ 
her back from the dead. You should have been there that 
morning to prevent the murder. Hope you enjoyed your 
skiing that day. The laughs on you. 
The killer 
John H. Maurer 




Salt Lahe Legal Defender Assoc. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
: QUESTIONS TO THE JURY 
Plaintiff PANEL ON VOIR DIRE 
v. : 
JOHN HENRY MAURER : Case No. CR-85-311 
Defendant 
The defendant, JOHN HENRY MAURER, by and through his 
attorneys of record, NANCY BERGESON and JAMES BRADSHAW, 
respectfully submit the following interrogatories for the voir 
dire of the prospective jurors in the above numbered case. 
QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY PANEL 
1. Where are you employed? 
2. What are your duties there? 
3. How long have you been so employed? 
4« Do you have any plans for a change of employment in 
the near future? If so: 
Why do you plan to change your place of employment? 
Where do you plan to change your employment to? 
uY K (.Annie iQCxJ> 
ft' Deputy Clerk 
C* tr*-«re is * cur spouse employed? 
7. Wh^t are his or her duties at that place of 
employment? 
8. How long has your spouse been so employed? 
9. Does your spouse have any plans for a change in 
employment? If so: 
Why does he (she) plan to make such a change? 
Where does he (she) plan to change his (her) places of 
employment to? 
10. Do you have any children? If so: 
State the age and sex of each of these children? 
Which of these children reside with you? 
Are any of these children employed? 
If so, describe the nature and length of this employment. 
Are any of these children married? 
Which of these children are married? 
11. Do you have any grandchildren? If so: 
What are the ages and sex of each of these grandchildren? 
Which of your children are parents? 
12. Do you belong to any clubs or organizations? If so: 
What clubs or organizations do you belong to? 
Have you ever held any elected or leadership positions in 
the club or organization? If so: 
What was the nature of that position: 
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13. What are your hobbies and leisure time activities? 
14. What do you rely on for your sources of information, 
i.e., newspapers, magazinesf television, radio, or word of mouth? 
15. Do you subscribe to any publications (including 
newspapers): If so: 
What are the publications that you subscribe to? 
Do you read these publications regularly? 
16. Have you lived in any place other than Salt Lake 
County for any length of time? If so: 
How long have you lived in Salt Lake County? 
Where did you live before you came here? 
Why did you decide to move to Salt Lake County? 
17. Is there anything else that you feel that we should 
know about you? 




Did you specialize in any particular area of law? 
Did you graduate? 
If you are currently practicing law, what is the nature 
of your practice? 
Would this prevent you in any way in following the 
instructions on the law as given to you by this court? 
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19. Co any cf ]cu have any close n c n u s «»«. •» ^=.^  «»*_*> «^ .» — ..w 
are lawyers or law students? If so: 
What is the name of that friend or relative? 
Where does he or she practice law or go to school? 
What is the nature of his or her practice? 
Would that prevent you in any way from following the 
instructions on the law as given to you by the court? 
20. Do any of you know the prosecutors, Mr. Morgan or 
Mr. MacDougal? 
21. Do any of you know any of the State's witnesses? 
22. Do any of you know the alleged victim of this 
offense, or any members of her family? 
23. Do any of you know the defendant, JOHN HENRY MAURER, 
or any member of his immediate family? 
24. Have you ever heard of JOHN HENRY MAURER in any 
context other than may relate to this case? 
25. Do any of you know Mr. Maurer's attorneys, Nancy 
Bergeson and James Bradshaw? 
26. Do any of you know anyone who works for Sperry 
Univac Corp.? If so, who, and what is the nature of the 
relationship? 
27. Do any of you know anything about the facts of this 
case other than what you have heard in court today? If so: 
Have you read stories about this case in the newspapers 
or heard about it over the radio or television? 
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Have you discussed the case with someone who claimed to 
know something about the facts of the case? 
28. Have any of you ever been employed by the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office or any law enforcement agency? If so: 
What was the nature of that employment? 
What were your duties? 
When were you so employed? 
Would that experience affect in any way your ability to 
serve on this jury in a fair and impartial manner? 
29. Do any of you have close friends or relatives who 
have been employed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office or 
any law enforcement agency? 
If so, name the friend or relation and the agency he or 
she worked for. 
30. Would this relationship in any way affect your 
ability to sit on this jury in a fair and impartial manner? 
31. Are there any of you who would tend to give more 
credibility or weight to the testimony of a police officerf merely 
because he or she is a police officerr than you would to any other 
witness? 
32. If the defendant were to testify, would you give his 
testimony the same weight and credit that you would give to any 
other witness? 
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33. Ha% e any of ycu ever served on a jury before? X€ 
so: 
What type of case was it? 
When was the trial? 
Were you the foreman? 
What was the verdict? 
Would that experience affect your ability to serve this 
jury in a fair and impartial manner? 
\/ 34. Have any of you ever been called as a witness 
before? If so: 
What type of case was it? 
What was the nature of your testimony? 
When was the trial or hearing? 
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on 
this jury in a fair and impartial manner? 
35. Have any of you or your close friends or relatives 
ever been the victim of a criminal offense? If so: 
What was the nature of the offense? 
Was anybody charged, arrested or convicted of that 
offense? 
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on 
this jury in a fair and impartial manner? 
36. Have any of you or your close friends or relatives 
ever been accused of a crime before? If so: 
What was the nature of the charge? 
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?i*ould that experience affect your ability to serve on 
this jury in a fair and impartial manner? 
37• How do you feel the courts have dealt with the 
rights of persons accused of crimes versus the rights of the 
people in society? 
38. What are your feelings about someone accused of 
murder? 
39. Would any of you prefer, for any reason, not to sit 
on this case? 
If so, why do you not want to sit on this jury? 
40. Are there any of you who are not in such a fair and 
impartial state of mind that you would not be satisfied to have a 
juror possessing your mental state judge the evidence if you or 
your loved ones were on trial here? 
41. Does the mere fact that Mr. Maurer is charged with 
this offense in the Information cause any of you to believe that 
he is probably guilty as charged? 
42. Do you now presume Mr. Maurer to be innocent of the 
:rime as charged? 
43. Do any of you feel that Mr. Maurer has a burden to 
>rove his innocence? 
44. Do you understand Mr. Maurer has no obligation to 
estify? 
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explain his actions? 
46. Do you promise to place no burden on Mr. Maurer to 
prove innocence, but rather require the state to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt before you could convict Mr. Maurer as 
charged? 
47. Iff after hearing the evidence, you came 
to the conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the guilt of 
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found that a 
majority of the jurors believed the defendant was guilty, would 
you change your verdict only because you were in the minority? 
48. Are there any of you who would not give 
the benefit of your own individual judgment in arriving at a 
verdict in this case? 
49. Would any of you feel pressure to impose a verdict 
of guilty because your family, neighbors or community expects it 
of you? 
50- Ihe following questions deal with special issues 
arising in this homicide case. The lawyers want you to be honest 
with your impressions and feelings. Being a good juror may mean 
also that you not sit in this case, and you can do justice to the 
system by responding genuinely and openly. 
(a) Have any of you had experience with psychiatrists or 
psychologists? 
What is your opinion of them? 
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Do j-cu thin*- they ha\ e valuable insights into human 
behavior? 
If not, would you be likely to disregard testimony they 
might offer? 
You have undoubtedly heard much publicity about cases 
involving the insanity defense, or defenses of diminished mental 
capacity (e.g. John Hinckley case, Dan White case). Do you feel 
that a person's mental illness should not be a defense or even 
discussed in a criminal case? 
(b) What do you understand the crime of manslaughter to 
be? 
Do you associate it with someone "getting off"? 
(c) The State will introduce a letter written by Mr. 
Maurer to the father of the victim, Janet Hannon. The letter will 
undoubtedly offend ycu and trigger an angry response within you. 
Would you be able to set aside such anger and objectively 
view all of the information you are given about this letter? 
Would you be able to set aside such anger and objectively 
view the central fact6* and legal issues in this case? 
What are 2 or 3 most important aspects of being a parent? 
(d) Are there any of you who feel that parents sometimes 
place too much pressure on their children to achieve? If so, how 
do you think these expectations can harm children? 
Do any of you think you came from a family of 
"overachievers"? 
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of the family? 
(e) Do any of you disagree that people can be driven to 
extreme emotional distress as a result of a relationship with a 
loved one? 
Have you ever witnessed others driven to violence as a 
result of such a relationship? 
Have you ever been in a position of comforting one who 
has been left by a boyfriend or girlfriend for someone new? 
Have you ever taken a sedative or other therapeutic drug 
when faced with an emotionally violitile circumstance? 
(f) Do any of you have strong feelings against the use 
of drugsf particularly cocaine? 
Do you belong to any groups or organizations; including 
religious ones, that advocate against the use of drugs? 
If so, which ones? 
Have any of you ever had experience with people who use 
drugs? 
If so, was this in a personal or professional (including 
volunteer) context? 
(g) Do any of you have strong feelings against the use 
of alcohol? 
How many of you do not drink? 
Why not? 
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k*r4 ycd r»t*aislir Itr*©*** anyone who Is an alcoholic or a 
recovered alcoholic? 
DATED this V x day of November, 1985. 




(Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
this /\y day of November, 1985. 
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